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Introduction
DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING WAS CONFIDENT that the arc of the
moral universe bends towards justice.1 The history of the at-will doc-
trine in employment law is an example of this arc, as the nationwide
jurisprudence moves away from the doctrine and towards a more just
social compact. This Article argues that the at-will doctrine is immoral
and that it is time for the common law to reject it.
Part I examines the historical nature and the roots of the at-will
doctrine, as many articles before have done. Part II looks at the eco-
nomic and contractual foundation of the at-will doctrine. Part III de-
scribes the exceptions to the at-will doctrine, which demonstrate the
movement towards its rejection. This movement has resulted from the
recognition of the at-will doctrine’s moral weakness. Part IV examines
the immorality of the remaining vestiges of the doctrine. Part V dem-
onstrates the ability of the common law to eliminate this doctrine.
This Article primarily utilizes the moral language of the 1986 Pas-
toral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All:
Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, as a basis
for critiquing the at-will doctrine.2
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1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here? (Aug. 16, 1967), in A CALL
TO CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 165 (Clayborne
Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001).
2. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL
LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter PAS-
TORAL LETTER].
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I. The At-Will Rule: Its Nature and Legal Roots
The at-will doctrine (also referred to as the at-will rule) permits
an employer to fire an employee at any time “for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being . . . guilty of
legal wrong.”3
A century later, the rule remained unchanged, “[a]bsent any con-
tract, . . . the employment is ‘at will,’ and the employee can be fired
with or without good cause.”4
The genesis of the at-will doctrine dates back to a treatise au-
thored by Horace Gray Wood in 1877. The treatise provides that in
America, “a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring atwill.”5
Therefore, “no presumption attaches” that a hiring is for any specific
term.6
This purported statement of the American rule was in fact a mis-
statement. Until this definition announced by Wood, the American
legal treatises relied on the English rule, which presumed that a hir-
3. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884), overruled by Hutton v. Wat-
ters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915).
4. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376 (Cal. 1988). The evolution of
the at-will rule, through legislation and judicial decisions, is described more fully in many
earlier articles. E.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416–19 (1967); Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power: United
States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432–33 (1964); Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816,
1824–28 (1980).
5. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (Wil-
liam S. Hein & Co., 1981) (1877).
6. Id. The treatise furthered that:
[I]f the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was
for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Id. at 272.
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ing for no fixed term was limited to one year.7 American courts uncrit-
ically accepted Wood’s formulation of the rule.8
Subsequently, the at-will rule was codified in many states.9 The
effect of such legislation made judicial change in the at-will rule either
impossible or much more difficult.10 Each state that codified the at-
will doctrine, with the exception of Montana, continues to follow it.11
However, the doctrine is currently subject to various exceptions (de-
scribed infra in Part III).
Over time, the rote application of the at-will rule has led to ineq-
uitable, immoral, and shocking applications. Some of these applica-
tions presaged the development of exceptions to the rule; others
persist even after the exceptions developed. For example, in Martin v.
New York Life Insurance Co., the New York Court of Appeals applied the
at-will doctrine to affirm the termination of an employee following ten
7. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). Feinman observes that Wood’s scholarship was curiously deficient:
First, the four American cases [Wood] cited in direct support of the rule were in
fact far off the mark. Second, his scholarly disingenuity was extraordinary; he
stated incorrectly that no American courts in recent years had approved the En-
glish rule, [and] that the employment at will rule was inflexibly applied in the
United States . . . . Third, in the absence of valid legal support, Wood offered no
policy grounds for the rule he proclaimed.
Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
8. Perhaps the most striking example can be found in an opinion of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee in Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507.
9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (Supp. 2010) (“The employment relationship is
severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee
and the employer have signed a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the
employment relationship shall remain in effect for a specified duration of time or other-
wise expressly restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment relation-
ship.”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 2011) (“An employment, having no specified term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
7-1 (2008) (“If a contract of employment provides that wages are payable at a stipulated
period, the presumption shall arise that the hiring is for such period, provided that, if
anything else in the contract indicates that the hiring was for a longer term, the mere
reservation of wages for a lesser time will not control. An indefinite hiring may be termi-
nated at will by either party.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (2005) (“A man is at liberty to
dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for so
doing. The servant is also free to depart without assigning any cause.”); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 34-03-01 (2004) (“An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the
will of either party on notice to the other, except when otherwise provided by this title.”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4 (1993) (“An employment having no specified term may be
terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, except when otherwise pro-
vided by statute.”).
10. See infra Part V.
11. Montana, in 1987, adopted a statute requiring an employer to have “cause” to
terminate an employee. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2011).
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years of service (with no concern for the employee).12 In this context,
application of the at-will doctrine did not take into consideration the
length or quality of the employee’s service. The at-will doctrine has
also privileged overt racial discrimination; in 1908, some 200 black
stevedores were fired to make room for white stevedores.13
In this century, the at-will doctrine has been used to sustain fir-
ings for conduct that implicates public interest or rudimentary fair-
ness. For example, a private security officer was lawfully terminated
for his “cop mentality” subsequent to reporting that he saw a store
manager take merchandise.14 Similarly, in Lloyd v. Drake University, a
white campus security officer was lawfully fired after attempting to
“forcibly subdue a black football player” who the security officer per-
ceived to be assaulting a white female student.15 The termination was
effected to dampen a serious public relations problem for the em-
ployer, which resulted from a video depicting the guard’s actions.16 In
Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., the court upheld an employee termination
that resulted from a claim that she was wrongfully discharged for ask-
ing to consult her attorney before signing a job performance
reprimand.17
These examples demonstrate that ultimately, the potential for ar-
bitrariness is inherent in the concept of a right to fire for any reason,
no reason, or even a reason that is morally repugnant.
II. The At-Will Rule and Economic History
The at-will rule mirrored the dominant economic ethos of the
time of Mr. Wood’s treatise:
After 1860, the rich got richer and expanded their factories, mines
and banks. The poor had children; and in addition, their relatives
came over from the old country. The new industrial system created
or exploited a huge pool of workers. Many were immigrants. . . .
12. 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
13. Clarke v. Atl. Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908).
14. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482 (Md. 2002) (holding that because the
employee did not report the suspected criminal activity to official law enforcement, the
employee had no protection based on Maryland’s common law public policy exception to
the at-will rule); Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that an
employee could be fired as an at-will employee even when he reported illegal financial
activities to his supervisor as he believed he was required to do by written corporate
policy).
15. 686 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 2004).
16. Id.
17. 823 A.2d 590 (Md. 2003).
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These workers in industry were poor; work and life were
hard. . . . Conditions in many factories and mines were appalling.
Employers hired and fired at will; there was little or no job security,
and the worker was trapped in a web of company rules. The busi-
ness cycle added special miseries. Social services were weak; sick-
ness, broken bones, or a downturn in business added new threats
to the worker’s security. Many employers were callous in fact;
others adopted the detached, studied callousness of social Darwin-
ism. That the workers should remain unorganized, that business
should be free from control, that the health of enterprise was the
way, the truth, the consummate social good: this was the faith of
the dominant class.18
A. The Laissez-Faire Economics Ethos
Professor James Gross has aptly described the philosophy of lais-
sez-faire economics as:
[A]n elaborate and interconnected set of values in which freedom is
the economic freedom of the entrepreneur; democracy is a govern-
mental system that gives maximum protection to property rights;
progress is economic growth; individualism means the right to use
one’s property as one desires and to compete with others; and soci-
ety is a market society that promotes and does nothing to interfere
with the competition in which the fittest win out.19
It is not surprising that the courts adopted and enforced this
ethos in the name of freedom, democracy, progress, individualism,
and society. A good example is the oft-cited 1866 case of Ryan v. New
York Central Railroad, where the court rejected any notion that a rail-
road was liable for damage—to property owners—resulting from a
fire that the railroad’s negligence caused.20 Regarding Ryan, the legal
commentator Francis Wharton fairly rhapsodized that protection of
the individual must cede to the interest of the big business class:
But no corporation can be ruined without bringing ruin to some of
the noblest and most meritorious classes of the land. . . . We hear
sometimes of the cruelty of the eviction of laborers from their cot-
tages at a landlord’s caprice. But there are no evictions which ap-
proach in vastness and bitterness to those which are caused by the
stoppage of railway improvements or of manufacturing corpora-
18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 553–54 (2d ed. 1985) (foot-
note omitted).
19. JAMES A. GROSS, A SHAMEFUL BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERI-
CAN WORKPLACE 49 (2010).
20. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
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tions; in few cases is there such misery to the laboring classes
worked, as when one of these great institutions is closed.21
In retrospect, few may be surprised that a young, growing indus-
trial and commercial giant adopted economic values best character-
ized as “libertarian,” “laissez-faire,” or “free-market economy.” The at-
will doctrine was most congenial to a sublimation of the individual
worker’s interests.
B. Workers as Property & Contract Theory
With a laissez-faire system, inexpensive immigrant labor enabled
a worker to be treated as a commodity like a wheel, a barrel, or any
widget. Property rights were preeminent. Worker rights were in pain-
ful and often futile gestation. Individual rights and distributive justice
could gain no recognition in this free-market ethos. There simply was
no room for such rights in social Darwinism:
[The self-executing market economy] was the source of the perva-
sive view that justice required only equality of opportunity—that
everyone be enabled to begin the competitive race equally—and
that any requirement of equality of condition or results certainly
was illegitimate. For it was well recognized that, given the unequal
distribution of talent, energy, and luck, equality of opportunity in-
evitably resulted in organized inequality.22
Because social Darwinism decreed that it was in the “nature” of things
that workers have no workplace rights, it would be unjust to give work-
ers job security to counter the at-will doctrine.23
As a result of social Darwinism, it was simply in the “nature” of
things that at-will employment contracts produced unfairness to work-
ers. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1905 recognized and utilized this ap-
proach in the landmark decision of Lochner v. New York.24 In Lochner,
the Court struck down a New York statute setting the maximum hours
that bakers could work. The Court held the statute to present an un-
constitutional interference with an employer’s freedom of contract.
In Adair v. United States, the Court similarly upheld the validity of
an at-will contract by finding unconstitutional a federal statute that
prohibited employers from discharging railroad employees for mem-
21. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 at 58
(1992) (quoting Francis Wharton, Liability of Railroad Companies for Remote Fires, 1 S. L. REV.
(NEW SERIES) 729 (1876)).
22. Id. at 194 (citation omitted).
23. Social Darwinism means an evolutionary determinism not capable of being de-
flected or reshaped by legislation. See id. at 121.
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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bership in a labor organization.25 The infamous Yellow Dog contract
gave employers the right to require employees to foreswear union
membership as both a condition to being employed and a condition
to remain employed.26 The Court reasoned, “the employer and the
employe´ have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that
equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which
no government can legally justify in a free land.”27
Subsequently, in 1915 the Supreme Court applied Adair in the
decision of Coppage v. Kansas to invalidate a state statute that imposed
a criminal penalty for an employer that makes or enforces a Yellow
Dog contract.28 In reaffirming Adair, the Court stated that a worker’s
lack of independence in contracting for his labor was one of the “ine-
qualities of fortune,” which naturally occurs in all contracts.29 The
Fourteenth Amendment “recognizes ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ as co-exis-
tent human rights” with which the state could not interfere.30 The
opinion overruled the Kansas Supreme Court which stated, “ ‘em-
ploye´s, as a rule, are not financially able to be as independent in mak-
ing contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making
contracts of purchase thereof.’”31 The Kansas court’s concern was
disregarded.
The American law of contracts, operating through the freedom
of contract, was the tool to perpetuate this free-market ethos. As Pro-
fessor Gross stated, “[t]he freedom of contract doctrine as applied to
the workplace in this country historically separated law from morals
and ignored the power imbalance inherent in the employer-worker
relationship.”32
25. 208 U.S. 161 (1908), abrogated in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729
(1963). The Ferguson Court held that “[t]he doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, . . .
and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they
believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded.” Ferguson, 372
U.S. at 729.
26. Adair, 208 U.S. at 171. The term “yellow dog” is attributed to an editorial in a 1921
United Mine Workers’ Journal: “The agreement . . . reduces to the level of a yellow dog any
man that signs it, for he signs away every right he possesses . . . and makes himself the
truckling helpless slave of the employer.” JOEL I. SEIDMAN, THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT
11–38 (1932).
27. Adair, 208 U.S. at 175. This statutory provision was also found to offend the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of the right to property. Id. at 176.
28. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. GROSS, supra note 19, at 210. R
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Yet, in dissent Justice Holmes believed that there could not be
real liberty of contract until there was some initial equality of bargain-
ing position.33 This notion presaged the evolution of this Nation’s
values.
C. The Great Depression and the Movement Away from the At-
Will Doctrine
The most renowned contract law scholars of the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth century, such as Williston, Langdell, and Corbin,
rooted the nature of contract in individual autonomy.34 The result was
that freedom of contract, as a concept, was the alter ego to the free
market or to laissez-faire economics.35 It was amoral in the sense of
being largely unconcerned with the moral or justice values to be dis-
cussed later in this Article.36 Critics of freedom to contract have since
noted the illusory nature of this principle.37
The break with this preference for a free-market economy (also
referred to as laissez-faire economy) came as a result of the cataclys-
mic failure of these very free and unregulated markets, now known as
“The Great Depression,”38 not as a result of a sudden moral epiphany.
The days that placed near sacred regard for allowing the nation’s
best interests to be decided by unbridled industry and commerce were
gone. The benefits of totally free markets proved to be illusory. The
previous beliefs endorsed by courts—that interests of workers came
secondary to that of the employers—were brutally shattered by bread
lines, insurmountable unemployment rates, suicides, and other social
maladies.
33. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 27 (“If that belief [that a worker needed a union], whether
right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by
law in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of
contract begins.”).
34. See Vincent D. Rougeau, Just Contracts and Catholic Social Teaching: A Perspective from
Anglo-American Law, in THE TRUE WEALTH OF NATIONS: CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 117 (Daniel K. Finn ed., 2010).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Madelyn C. Squire, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social Justice Theory: Are They a
Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 641, 644–46 (1990).
38. GROSS, supra note 19, at 61–62 (“In the autumn of 1929 the mightiest of Ameri- R
cans were, for a brief time, revealed as human beings. Like most humans, most of the time,
they did some very foolish things. On the whole, the greater the earlier reputation for
omniscience, the more serene the previous idiocy, the greater the foolishness now ex-
posed. Things that in other times were concealed by a heavy fac¸ade of dignity now stood
exposed, for the panic suddenly, almost obscenely, snatched the fac¸ade away.” (quoting
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 3 (Houghton Mifflin 1961))).
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The climate surrounding the Great Depression paved the way for
Congress’ passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 (also referred to as the
National Labor Relations Act).39 In its formal findings of fact, Con-
gress expressly stated that employers and employees do not have
equality of bargaining power.40 Instead, the relevant inquiry is the “in-
equalities of fortune” that must be equalized through collective
bargaining.41
The Wagner Act was motivated by Senator Robert Wagner’s de-
sire to enable workers and employers to bargain from levels of com-
parative strength and to achieve industrial peace through collective
bargaining. The Senator observed that laissez-faire economics had
caused “men [to become] the servile pawns of their masters in the
factories.”42 Today, the Senator’s hopes have yet to be broadly and
fully realized in organized places of employment, a subject beyond the
present topic.
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the constitutionality of the
Act was upheld.43 While Jones & Laughlin did not formally overrule
Adair, it confirmed that an evolutionary rejection of the free-market
gods had begun and that an arc towards a more just balance was at
least becoming possible.
D. The Modern Survival of the At-Will Doctrine
Although collective bargaining agreements now generally protect
organized employees from the at-will rule, by permitting employers to
terminate only for “cause,” the at-will rule survives in unorganized
39. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449–50 (1935).
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
41. Id. (“The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce . . . .”). The commerce power was utilized to balance what had been
the unbalanced, free application of liberty and property in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It is worth noting that the Wagner Act arose as part of the New Deal of the
Roosevelt Administration in direct reaction to the failure of American free enterprise, rep-
resented by the crash and Great Depression of the 1930s. TIMOTHY J. HEINSZ, DENNIS R.
NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 101–02
(6th ed. 2009).
42. James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law
Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 10 (1985) (quoting Sen. Robert Wagner) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN302.txt unknown Seq: 10 16-MAY-12 10:04
664 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
workplaces in the United States.44 As long as support of a laissez-faire
economy exists, employees will continue to be subjected to at-will em-
ployment. For example, the CEO of Massey Energy recently stated,
“[w]e need to let businesses function as businesses . . . . Corporate
business is what built America, in my opinion, and we need to let it
thrive by, in a sense, leaving it alone.”45 This statement followed an
explosion in 2010 that killed twenty-nine miners.46 The mentality that
regrets government regulation of job place safety is the same mental-
ity that believes workers may be fired at-will.
The tendency to associate the at-will rule with efficiency has con-
tributed to its survival. Efficient markets and wealth maximization are
modern notions endorsed by the Chicago School of Economics.47
Markets are more “efficient” when employers are not weighed down
by restrictions on their ability to terminate employees freely. The ef-
fect of this school of thought has been widely discussed48 and criti-
cized on both economic and moral bases.49
This ideology is pervasive and limits the extent that jurisprudence
bends towards justice. For example, in First National Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, a divided Supreme Court held that management’s decision
to partially close a business does not need to be bargained about with
the workers’ certified bargaining representative—even though the de-
cision directly affects workers’ lives.50 The Court reasoned that
“[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining
process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable busi-
44. Peter J. Strelitz, Arturo M. Aviles & David Walter, Employment-At-Will: Has the Death
Knell Officially Sounded?, INT’L HR J., Summer 2008, at 16; see also James A. Sonne, Firing
Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235 (2007); supra notes
9–11. R
45. Dana Milbank, 29 Dead, and a Coal CEO Blames Government, WASH. POST, July 25,
2010, at A17 (quoting Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey Energy).
46. Id. The coal company had thousands of violations in recent years and is now fac-
ing a federal criminal investigation for negligent and reckless practices. Id.
47. This ideation was initially developed over thirty years ago in Economic Analysis of
Law by now-Judge Richard Posner. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th
ed. 2011).
48. See, e.g., Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Ap-
proach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1038–96 (2003);
Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law & Economics Moral?—Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal
Critique of Posner’s Economic Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 147 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Paul Malloy, Equating
Human Rights and Property Rights—The Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law
and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 163 (1986).
50. 452 U.S. 666, 678–79 (1981).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN302.txt unknown Seq: 11 16-MAY-12 10:04
Winter 2012] REJECTION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE 665
ness.”51 Achieving a balance of bargaining power continues to be an
elusive goal for those interested in a more just social compact for
workers.
It remains to be seen whether the Great Recession of today—re-
sulting from the greed and fraud of the financial market—will lead to
a popular rejection of the at-will rule. Certainly, the Emergency Stabi-
lization Act of 2008,52 which gave billions of dollars to save those com-
panies deemed to be “too-big-to-fail,” proves that a faith in an
unbridled market economy is a misplaced faith—a faith that is only
embraced by some when it is convenient and profitable to do so.
These economic disasters of extraordinary proportions have demon-
strated that efficient markets and wealth maximization do not merit
the advantage provided by the legally protected power to fire at-will.
As is next explained, U.S. law has evolved, providing greater
worker security at the expense of a free or efficient market, or specifi-
cally, at the expense of the at-will rule.
III. The Exceptions
The libertarian laissez-faire milieu, which was so congenial to the
at-will rule, has not worn well with an evolving moral conscience in the
United States. Numerous exceptions to the at-will rule are present in
both judicial decisions and statutes. These exceptions have undercut
the Supreme Court’s recognition, in 1908, that purported “mutuality”
of contract supported the at-will doctrine.53 The at-will rule has itself
become the exception.
A. Legislative Exceptions
Often overlooked as limiting, the at-will rule is the “philosophi-
cal” exception of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.54 Section 6 of the
Clayton Act provides, “[t]he labor of a human being is not a commod-
ity or article of commerce.”55 This is in stark contrast to prior anti-
trust laws—specifically, the Sherman Antitrust Act—that rely on the
notion that the labor of a human being is the same as any other com-
51. Id.
52. Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
53. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174–75 (1908) (“[T]he right of the employe´
to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of the employe´.”).
54. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27 (2006), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)). The Clayton Act prohibits employers from
obtaining an injunction to prevent employees from quitting. Id.
55. § 6, 38 Stat. at 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17).
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modity.56 This notion prevented collective action to achieve job secur-
ity, better wages, and better working conditions.57 The Clayton Act
effectively facilitated collective action by restraining the ability of fed-
eral courts to issue restraining orders and injunctions in favor of em-
ployers.58 Even though the Supreme Court later held that the Clayton
Act did not give protection from the Sherman Act, the philosophical
point remained: the labor of a human being may not be treated sim-
ply as any other fungible article in commerce. Section 6 of the Clayton
Act admitted of the moral uniqueness of a “human being.”
The single largest exception to the ability of employers to fire at-
will arose in the federal labor laws of this country. The first such law
was the Railway Labor Act in 1926.59 The Act made it possible for
workers to organize and to reach agreements with employers that
limit the employer’s ability to terminate its workers to instances with
“for cause” justifications.60 The Wagner Act extended this protection
from the railroad industry to much of the private sector.61 Over the
years, the issue of “cause” for discharge, or lesser forms of discipline,
has been grist for the mill of arbitrators who by their decisions effec-
tively define its meaning on a case-by-case basis.62
56. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
57. The (in)famous Danbury Hatters’ case was the first case in which the Supreme
Court approved the application of the Sherman Act (at the request of an employer) to
defeat collective action to unionize. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Fourteen years
of litigation, two jury trials, four reviews in the Circuit, and three reviews in the Supreme
Court resulted in a judgment enforceable against the personal assets of the workers and
their supporters who engaged in an alleged conspiracy. The nation’s laissez-faire public
policy could not brook interference with free competition. See generally Daniel R. Ernst, The
Danbury Hatters’ Case, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 180 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J.
King eds., 1992). Thus, part of the corrective was to state bluntly that a human being is not
a commodity. Senator Albert Cummins of Iowa said, “It is high time that we recognize the
difference between the power of a man to produce something and the thing which he
produces.” 51 CONG. REC. 14,585 (1914).
58. § 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52); United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219, 233 (1941).
59. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151–188 (2006)).
60. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 Fourth (referring specifically to the rights of organization,
collective bargaining, and freedom from interference from railway carries).
61. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 301.
62. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 923–1000 (Alan
Miles Ruben et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003). As a result of these enactments, employers now must
often defend dismissals of employees by showing “just cause” unrelated to the alleged dis-
crimination. The result is that “just cause” is not unknown by American business, even
outside the unionized context, and business has successfully lived with the need to show
“just cause.” See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to “Just
Cause” Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519, 563–64 (1978).
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These statutory exceptions are significant because they developed
in response to the laissez-faire ideology that had dominated the Amer-
ican experience. In 1933, passage of the National Industrial Recovery
Act provided that employees have the right to organize and to bargain
for wage and hour protections.63 However, this Act had no enforce-
ment mechanism, and in the face of mounting and often strident de-
mands by workers to be able to organize effectively, Senator Wagner
was able to gain passage of the National Labor Relations Act, as de-
scribed supra.64
In 1938, Congress adopted the Fair Labor Standards Act that
fixed minimum wages and hours.65 It represented a moral judgment
that free-market regulation failed to provide necessary minimum la-
bor standards.
Subsequent legislation prohibiting the employer’s right to dis-
criminate further restricted the termination right of the at-will doc-
trine. In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that
forbids discrimination—preventing discharge of an employee on the
basis of race, color, national origin, gender, and religion.66 In 1967,
Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which
protects employees from termination on the basis of age discrimina-
tion.67 Later, the Americans with Disabilities Act similarly constricts
the ability of employers to discharge on the basis of disabilities.68
In 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted to
provide statutory limits on termination69 by prohibiting retaliation
against workers seeking the enforcement of safety and health stan-
dards. In 1974, section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income and
Security Act prohibited employers from terminating employees in or-
der to deprive them of plan benefits that might soon vest or to which
they might otherwise be entitled.70 In 1993, the Family and Medical
Leave Act71 prohibited employers from terminating employees seek-
ing to use the leave benefits provided under the Act.
63. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933), invalidated
by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
65. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 15(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1060, 1068 (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
67. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
70. Id. § 1140.
71. Id. § 2615.
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These statutes represent a determination by Congress that the
values inherent in them can only be asserted by limiting the free exer-
cise of business judgment. The “business of business” is no longer
morally unbridled business allowing for complete freedom to
terminate.
In addition to the limitations on the at-will rule approved by Con-
gress, any number of state statutes and local ordinances on the same
subjects require similar constriction on an employer’s right to termi-
nate an employee at-will. Judicial decisions in several states have also
long evidenced discontent with the at-will rule and created significant
exceptions further eroding the rule. The most widely accepted are (1)
the public policy exception; (2) the implied contract exception; and
(3) the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception.
B. Judical Exceptions
1. The Public Policy Exception
Courts have created a public policy exception to prevent employ-
ers exercising at-will termination. States were concerned that employ-
ers would use the threat of discharge to effectively coerce their
employees into committing illegal acts or concealing matters inimical
to public policy. In response to this concern, courts have found that
contractual terms are irrelevant where an employer conducts its busi-
ness in a manner contrary to fundamental public policy.
Some of the earliest cases arose in California. For example, in
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, the court
refused to uphold a firing that violated public policy.72 Specifically, a
union business agent was terminated for refusing to falsely testify to a
committee of the Legislature. In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the
court found that firing an employee for his refusal to engage in price
fixing (a state law violation) was an impermissible firing.73 The court
stated, “the relevant authorities both in California and throughout the
country establish that when an employer’s discharge of an employee
violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged em-
ployee may maintain a tort action” and recover compensatory and pu-
nitive damages.74 The legal issues have subsequently revolved around
what is a sufficient public policy to invoke the exception and how and
where it may be found. California courts have found that public policy
72. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
73. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
74. Id. at 1331.
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must be “firmly established,” “fundamental,” and “substantial,” as well
as rooted in a constitution, statute, or regulation.75
Forty states recognize this exception in some form.76 This excep-
tion is an expensive erosion of an employer’s free exercise of employ-
ment decisions, bending the arc away from at-will firings. Because the
action sounds in tort and may support punitive damages, this excep-
tion is a potentially costly erosion of an employer’s free exercise of
employment decisions.
2. The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception
One of the more widely recognized exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine is an implied-in-fact promise by an employer that he/she will not
terminate a worker without good cause. Finding such an implied
promise rebuts the common law presumption of the at-will doctrine.77
The availability of this exception requires a highly individualized
analysis of an employer’s course of conduct, which may create a rea-
sonable expectation that an employee will only be terminated for
good cause.78 Through this exception, the employer is simply held to
the implied consequences of their actions and statements.
Contractual promises may be inferred from a wide variety of
sources: statements made in the employee handbook, the employee’s
length of service, promotions, bonuses, and oral statements at the
time of a promotion.79 An employer who makes such implied
promises, regardless of motivation, whether motivated by a desire to
inspire employees to their best efforts or simply to deter employees
75. See, e.g., Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1057 (Cal. 1998); Gantt v. Sentry
Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 693–94 (Cal. 1992); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380
n.11 (Cal. 1988).
76. JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & RONALD M. GREEN, 2006 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN
RESOURCES LAW § 5.01(B) (2006).
77. Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924–25 (Ct. App. 1981).
78. Id. at 925–26.
79. See, e.g., id. at 919 (finding that a dishwasher told thirty-two years earlier that “if
you are loyal . . . and do a good job, your future is secure” was the promisee of a promise
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding that representations in an employee manual created a
legitimate expectation of job security for a manager that had been employed for five
years); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984) (holding that if
an employer “creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of
specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the
job,” the court will find an implied promise); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626–29 (Minn. 1983) (same); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505
N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. 1987) (listing twenty-five jurisdictions that recognize the contractually
binding nature of employee handbooks); Foley, 765 P.2d at 383–88 (same).
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from looking for other employment, will not be able to assert the com-
mon law defense of the at-will rule.
This exception is less effective than the public policy exception
because of the highly fact-sensitive analysis that is necessary to main-
tain this exception. For this reason, a plaintiff’s attorney may be disin-
clined to take such a case because the potential for monetary success
is not high. This exception, moreover, can be easily defeated. An em-
ployer can put language in a handbook to the effect that the at-will
relationship remains despite any indication by a manager or supervi-
sor to the contrary. In the face of such language, an employee has
little likelihood of success in obtaining damages for wrongful
termination.
About forty-five states have recognized some form of the implied-
in-fact contract exception.80 This exception further bends the arc of
justice away from firings at-will because, as a matter of justice, conse-
quences should exist for broken promises.
3. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception
This exception imports into the employment relationship an im-
plied covenant, or promise of good faith and fair dealing, with an em-
ployee by an employer.
The exception was first judicially recognized in Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.81 The intermediate California appellate court held that
where an employee had eighteen years of satisfactory service with an
employer that had “specific procedures for adjudicating employee dis-
putes,” there arose a legal covenant “to do nothing which would de-
prive plaintiff, the employee, of the benefits of the employment
bargain . . . .”82 This covenant had the effect of “precluding any dis-
charge of such an employee by the employer without good cause.”83
Damages, including punitive damages, could be sought, because a
duty was imposed by law and did not arise from contract.84 This hold-
ing provided a theory for litigating most terminations otherwise pre-
cluded by the at-will rule. Subsequently, employment law practices—
both plaintiff and defendant—exploded with lucrative business.
In 1988, in response to employer complaints about jury verdicts,
this exception was “corrected,” in California, by a holding that the
80. BUCKLEY & GREEN, supra note 76, § 5.03 tbl.5-1. R
81. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
82. Id. at 729.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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covenant was ex contractu—that it would not support anything more
than contractual damages.85 Yet, the court authored a passionate dis-
sent in support of the right and duty of the courts to articulate the
common law (in absence of an action on behalf of the legislature).86
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this result-ori-
ented majority, suffice it to say the genie was stuffed back in the bot-
tle, and the at-will rule regained significant protection.87
The roots of this exception had emerged even before the court’s
ruling in Cleary.88 In 1974, it was suggested that courts ought to imply
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing and then proceed to “bal-
ance the employer’s justification for dismissal against the employee’s
interest in job security,” a process currently referred to as “progressive
discipline.”89 The note is as timely today as it was in 1974. This Article
will return to the topic of progressive discipline.90
Some states recognize an exception using intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, or defama-
tion.91 Like any evolutionary process, new possible exceptions to the
at-will doctrine continue to emerge. For example, some states have
recently recognized, by statute, an exception where an employer can-
not fire an employee for following his or her conscience, as it relates
to health care. Illinois makes unlawful any discrimination resulting
from a person’s “conscientious refusal to receive, obtain, accept, per-
form, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any
way in any particular form of health care services contrary to his or
her conscience.”92 Illinois defines conscience as a “sincerely held set
of moral convictions.”93 Similar protections for conscience exist in
Mississippi and Washington.94
85. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988) (stating that it was
for the legislature to dictate otherwise).
86. Id. at 415–17 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Justice Kaufman was a devout member of
the conservative bloc of the Court, so his dissent is noteworthy. See infra Part V.
87. Foley reversed the boom in business for both plaintiff and defense counsel. One
defense firm, just a month prior to judgment, had taken out a million dollar lease on an
additional floor for new attorneys who would now be let go and/or not hired.
88. J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 368 (1974).
89. Id.
90. See infra Part V.
91. BUCKLEY & GREEN, supra note 76. R
92. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2010).
93. Id. 70/3(e) (2010).
94. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160(2)(a)
(West 2011).
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This conscience exception is not limited to public sector employ-
ment, where constitutional issues might be anticipated. In addition,
unlike statutes excusing employer compliance (where such compli-
ance creates an “undue hardship” for an employer), these exceptions
to the at-will doctrine provide no such relief.95 A critical review ques-
tions whether this newest exception is sufficiently justified to become
another accepted exception in view of the need of employers in this
industry to perform health services without the complication of con-
science.96 Time will tell.
The sum total of all these exceptions to the at-will rule reflect a
deep-seated dissatisfaction with the at-will rule and with the economic
free play of the liberty of contract. The dissatisfaction is moral in na-
ture, implicating a piecemeal evolution of a moral consensus that the
at-will rule does not serve our deepest values as a people. Unless one
of these exceptions apply, some seventy-five million American workers
remain subject to the at-will rule.97
IV. The Immorality of the At-Will Doctrine
The at-will doctrine is immoral.
In 1986, the American Catholic Bishops declared that a worker is
morally entitled to “reasonable security against arbitrary dismissal.”98
This application of morality to employment law directly contradicted
the premise of the at-will doctrine.
First, morality must act in conjunction with legal theory and prac-
tice. Unlike those who contend that morality is irrelevant and should
not stand in the way of free markets, some concede that it is relevant
but should depend on a change of heart (a metanoia), which builds
from the bottom of society to accomplish moral change. As Professor
Robert Vischer has said, “[p]ushing moral ideals upward through em-
ployment and consumer transactions fosters social ties in ways that the
top-down enforcement of state-enshrined rules cannot.”99 That may
well be true because a change of heart may indeed make any law un-
necessary. The proposition, however, that morality should be laissez-
faire and that laissez-faire morality should itself be left to compete
with laissez-faire economics, is an abdication of the very roots of law.
95. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160(2)(a).
96. Sonne, supra note 44. R
97. See id. at 249.
98. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, para. 103. R
99. Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding Moral Mar-
ketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 95 (2006).
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It is an abdication because morality lies at the very heart of law,
even though its presence is not always explicit or acknowledged. “The
basic foundation of law, whether made by legislators or judges, is
moral choice.”100 The choices of an economic or labor policy:
[A]re choices of values: about justice and human and civil rights;
about the worth of individuals . . . ; about how and on what basis
the benefits and burdens of work and business will be apportioned;
and about how power, freedom, and equality are or are not harmo-
nized with justice at workplaces.101
Both religious and non-religious persons, as well as liberal and
conservative parties, insist upon the guidance from a moral compass.
The late historian Tony Judt wrote:
What’s missing from public conversation and public policy conver-
sation is precisely a sort of moral underpinning, a sense of the
moral purposes that bind people together in functional societies.
And part of the attraction of someone who otherwise didn’t appeal
to me in the least—like, say, Pope John Paul II—was how he man-
aged to connect with young people. . . . [H]is was the sense of an
absolutely, unambiguously, morally, noncompromising view about
what is right and what is wrong. . . . We need to reintroduce confi-
dently and unashamedly that kind of language into the public
realm.102
The current Pope, Benedict XVI, followed:
The worldwide financial breakdown has, as we know, demonstrated
the fragility of the present economic system and the institutions
linked to it. . . . It has also shown the error of the assumption that
the market is capable of regulating itself, apart from public inter-
vention and the support of internalized moral standards. This as-
sumption is based on an impoverished notion of economic life as a
sort of self-calibrating mechanism driven by self-interest and profit-
seeking. As such, it overlooks the essentially ethical nature of eco-
nomics as an activity of and for human beings.103
Then, it is self-deception or an illusion to pretend that economics
should be free of such moral evaluation.104 Legislators and courts
have already denied sanctuary from value judgments.105 Free-market
economists who refuse to accommodate moral values will continu-
ously face rejection. Reluctance to accept a role for moral values pre-
vents a vitally important dialogue concerning the application of such
100. GROSS, supra note 19, at 50. R
101. Id.
102. Christine Smallwood, Talking With Tony Judt, NATION, May 17, 2010, at 18.
103. Thomas J. Reese, Faith in God, Not the Market, WASH. POST (May 20, 2010, 12:57
PM), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/georgetown/2010/05/faith_in_god_
not_the_market.html (quoting Pope Benedict XVI).
104. GROSS, supra note 19, at 44. R
105. See supra Part III.
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values. It unintentionally denies economics its rightful and, indeed,
vitally important place in the dialogue concerning such values.106
As noted earlier, the at-will doctrine has been sustained on the
principles of a “property” right and a “contract” right. The values as-
signed to property and contracts are undeniably “moral” values. They
are not, however, the only moral values, nor are they the most impor-
tant. A property right is a human right.107 It exists to assist the liberty
of a person.108 It does not exist to suppress the right of a person to job
security, free from unjust termination. The contract right, based on
the amiable fiction that all workers have a meaningful freedom to con-
tract for employment, “epitomize[s] a separation of law and
morals.”109
It is urgently necessary to reassess the importance of property and
contract law in America’s understanding of its moral values. We must
determine whether they are given undue prominence in the legal sys-
tem. For some, such reassessment would take the form of giving work-
ers a property right of their own.110 Yet, it should not be necessary to
give workers a property right in order to recognize their moral right
to job security.
The theme of this Article is that the direct application of a moral
right to be free from the at-will doctrine is preferable to giving a prop-
erty right as a proxy for a moral right. Moral assessment depends on
human dignity, whether founded on that which is God-given or pre-
mised upon Immanuel Kant’s theory of a rational being.111
“Human rights are the minimum conditions for life in community. . . .
[H]uman rights include not only civil and political rights but also eco-
nomic rights. . . . [including] employment.”112 As Professor Sandel
concludes, “politics of moral engagement is not only a more inspiring
ideal than a politics of avoidance. It is also a more promising basis for
a just society.”113
106. See Malloy, supra note 49. R
107. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III), art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as
in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”).
108. Malloy, supra note 49, at 170–71. R
109. GROSS, supra note 19, at 55. R
110. Lofaso, supra note 49. R
111. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 104–05 (2009).
112. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, at viii (internal quotation mark omitted). R
113. SANDEL, supra note 111, at 269. R
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This Article will now directly address that moral engagement.
Thereafter, it will address the practical implications for legislators and
lawyers in terms of the common law.
A. The Pastoral Letter and Its Reception
In 1986, the American Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter
entitled Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy (“Pastoral Letter”).114 First authorized in 1980, the
Pastoral Letter developed through a multi-year process involving na-
tional consultations and formal hearings. It invited input from a multi-
plicity of interest groups and disciplines of all religions and none from
across the nation.115 The Pastoral Letter was finally adopted at a plenary
session of the American Bishops in November 1986.116
In the ensuing weeks and months, the Pastoral Letter was widely
discussed, welcomed, and harshly critiqued in the national media, in
business schools, and in other academic venues across the country.
This author was an emcee for a two-night symposium featuring several
nobel laureates at the University of California, Berkeley. At this sym-
posium, the Pastoral Letter was criticized by Milton Friedman and
lauded by John Kenneth Galbraith.
Of particular interest to this Article is Dr. Milton Friedman’s criti-
cism of the Pastoral Letter. Dr. Friedman was unable to reconcile the
relationship between morality and economics, unable to perceive a
connection. He feared that the application of moral norms to eco-
nomic activity would ruin the free-market economy. In his view, the
free-market economy had already benefited the world, and it still had
the capacity to do so much more. Ironically, Dr. Friedman did not see
that his embrace of the free market was itself a moral choice.
Dr. Friedman is not alone in his beliefs. Prominent Catholics, bar-
ons of finance and industry, ironically some even knighted by the
Church for their philanthropy, excoriated the Bishops for having left
their pulpits to suggest where the American economy was failing mor-
ally and where corrections could be made.117
114. See PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2. R
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. E.g., James Kilpatrick, Piety, Politics a Gassy Combination for Bishops, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL (Nov. 25, 1986), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1986-11-25/news/0270370232_1
_bishops-letter-politics (“The National Conference of Catholic Bishops recently voted 225
to 9 in favor of a 115-page pastoral letter called Economic Justice for All. . . . It wound up as
a gassy combination of piety and politics. Let us hear a round of applause for the nine who
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B. The Moral Analysis
This Article will now describe the moral analysis that leads to the
conclusion that the at-will doctrine is immoral. The Pastoral Letter re-
flects the Judeo-Christian tradition. It provides a language to discuss a
moral issue. The Pastoral Letter does not hide moral values behind con-
cepts of property or contract.
The Judeo-Christian moral analysis begins with the inherent dig-
nity of the human person.118 “[E]very human being possesses an inaliena-
ble dignity that stamps human existence prior to any division into races or
nations and prior to human labor and human achievement . . . .”119 This
God-given dignity has broad consequences for economic policy and
for the law that reflects such policy:
• “Every economic decision and institution must be judged in
light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the
human person. . . . We judge any economic system by what it
does for and to people and by how it permits all to participate in
it. The economy should serve people, not the other way
around.”120
• “All people have a right to participate in the economic life of
society. . . . For, it is through employment that most individuals
and families meet their material needs, exercise their talents,
and have an opportunity to contribute to the larger
community.”121
• “Human rights are the minimum conditions for life in commu-
nity. . . . [H]uman rights include not only civil and political
rights but also economic rights[,] . . . [including]
employment.”122
• “[A]ll persons have a right to earn a living . . . .”123
• “Society as a whole, acting through public and private institu-
tions, has the moral responsibility to enhance human dignity
and protect human rights.”124
voted ‘nay.’ For the most part, the bishops’ letter read like a platform of the national
Democratic Party.”).
118. Genesis 1:26–27; PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, para. 32. R
119. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, para. 32. R
120. Id. at viii (italics omitted) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at viii (italics omitted).
122. Id. at viii (italics omitted).
123. Id. para. 80.
124. Id. at ix (italics omitted).
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• “Productivity, however, cannot be measured solely by its output
in goods and services” but must also be measured by its “impact
on the fulfillment of basic needs . . . .”125
• “[The Church’s teaching] also rejects the notion that a free
market automatically produces justice.”126 It embraces neither
the argument “that an unfettered free-market economy, where
[their] owners, workers, and consumers pursue their enlight-
ened self-interest” is best; nor the argument “that the capitalist
system is inherently inequitable . . . . and must be replaced by a
radically different system that abolishes private property, the
profit motive, and the free market.”127 Rather, the teaching
looks at any system and asks “[w]hat is the impact of the system
on people? Does it support or threaten human dignity?”128
• “[P]eople have a right to employment” with “wages and other
benefits sufficient to support a family in dignity.” Similarly,
“[t]he dignity of workers also requires adequate health care,
security for old age or disability, unemployment compensa-
tion . . . and reasonable security against arbitrary dismissal.”129
In answer to Friedman, “[e]conomic questions are, thus, seen as a
part of a larger vision of the human person and the human family, the
value of this created earth, and the duties and responsibilities that all
have toward each other and toward this universe.”130
Duties and responsibilities towards one another arise from the
individual’s role as a part of a larger community. This Article speaks of
an individual worker’s moral right to be free from the arbitrary dismis-
sal that the at-will rule allows. Yet, the worker alone does not suffer.
The worker lives in community, and when fired wrongfully, a spouse,
partner, or dependent suffers as well. It is for this reason that the
modern heresy of Individualism, as explained by the noted sociologist
Robert Bellah, is implicated.131 It is implicated because Individualism
says the interest of the individual alone is of primary importance and
that we have no responsibilities for each other—the very thing that
the at-will rule allows employers to say with respect to their workers.
Thus, the fact that men and women do live in mutual interdepen-
125. Id. para. 71.
126. Id. para. 115.
127. Id. paras. 128–29.
128. Id. para. 130.
129. Id. para. 103 (emphasis added).
130. Id. para. 341.
131. ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 275–96 (1985).
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dence requires a more searching analysis of what is just, than a simple
analysis of what is legal, as a matter of an employment contract. This
Article now turns to the application of these principles to the at-will
rule.
C. The Moral Analysis Applied
The Pastoral Letter creates a more searching analysis by recalling
that Catholic social teaching has insisted upon three dimensions of
justice: distributive, commutative, and social justice.132
Distributive justice is concerned with the “effects” on persons
whose basic needs as human beings are unmet or are in jeopardy:
Distributive justice requires that the allocation of income, wealth,
and power in society be evaluated in light of its effects on persons
whose basic material needs are unmet. The Second Vatican Coun-
cil stated: “The right to have a share of earthly goods sufficient for
oneself and one’s family belongs to everyone.”133
Certainly, as the Pastoral Letter dictates that an economic system must
be judged by what it does “for” and “to” people, the economic justifi-
cation for the at-will doctrine fails the test.134
The at-will doctrine deprives individual workers of “the right to
participate in the economic life of society” by preventing them from
exercising the right to meet his/her material needs (including ac-
counting for the worker’s family).135 If the scope of human rights in-
cludes such economic rights, then the at-will doctrine deprives a
worker of the right to earn a living without any showing of “fault.”136
Society retains the “moral responsibility to enhance human dignity
and protect human rights.”137 Thus, society’s continuation of the at-
will doctrine represents a moral failure of our legal system. The free-
market ideology cannot support such a deprivation of human rights
and human dignity.138 “The economy should serve people, not the
other way around.”139
As to commutative justice, the Pastoral Letter states:
Commutative justice calls for fundamental fairness in all agree-
ments and exchanges between individuals or private social groups.
It demands respect for the equal human dignity of all persons in
132. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, para. 68. R
133. Id. para. 70 (italics omitted).
134. Id. at viii.
135. Id. at viii (italics omitted).
136. Id. at viii and para. 80.
137. Id. at ix.
138. Id. paras. 115, 127–29, 130.
139. Id. at viii.
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economic transactions, contracts, or promises. . . . Employers are
obligated to treat their employees as persons, paying them fair
wages in exchange for the work done and establishing conditions
and patterns of work that are truly human.140
American contract law arguably satisfies commutative justice to some
extent but fails in distributive and social justice. Indeed, it contributes
to injustice.141 Contract law is preoccupied with enforcing the intent
of the bargain. Admittedly, it does recognize the need for some funda-
mental fairness through recognition of defenses, such as undue influ-
ence, fraud, duress, mistake, impossibility, and unconscionability.
None of these defenses, however, assist workers that are hired into at-
will environments to avoid unjust termination from at-will
employment.
As to social justice, the Pastoral Letter states:
Social justice implies that persons have an obligation to be active
and productive participants in the life of society and that society
has a duty to enable them to participate in this way. This form of
justice can also be called “contributive,” for it stresses the duty of
all who are able to help create the goods, services, and other non-
material or spiritual values necessary for the welfare of the whole
community. . . . Productivity is essential if the community is to have
the resources to serve the well-being of all. Productivity, however,
cannot be measured solely by its output in goods and services.142
Social or contributive justice is concerned with the good of the com-
munity.143 An arbitrary firing harms the worker’s family but also the
larger community in which that family seeks to live and contribute. As
Professor Rougeau says, contract law’s understanding of the individual
is “rather feeble[,] . . . a shell without internal substance,” when com-
pared to the concepts of the individual in distributive and social
justice.144
The moral analysis of the Pastoral Letter is usefully accomplished
by a comparison to one of the defenses of the at-will doctrine. In 1984,
Professor Richard Epstein defended the at-will doctrine.145 To
counter a groundswell of opposition to the at-will doctrine, Professor
Epstein advanced two primary arguments for why it has not outlived
its usefulness. First, “freedom of contract . . . advance[s] individual
autonomy and . . . promote[s] the efficient operation of labor mar-
140. Id. para. 69.
141. Rougeau, supra note 34, at 118, 136. R
142. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, para. 71. R
143. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD & CHRISTIAN ETHICS 79–80 (2002).
144. Rougeau, supra note 34, at 133. R
145. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
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kets.”146 Second, the doctrine serves as a “rule of construction” to clar-
ify issues, such as what should be the duration of employment, or the
grounds for its termination, in lieu of an explicit employment con-
tract on such points.147 Neither of these rationales contains a moral
analysis. Indeed, both defenses of the doctrine are made as a reaction
to what Professor Epstein characterizes as “the movement for public
control of labor markets.”148
The growing exceptions to the at-will doctrine described in Part
III supra, however, did not spring unbidden from “public control,” or
“regulation,” as today’s polemic would call it. Rather, they came about
because of a moral consensus that arose against various applications of
the at-will rule. This consensus enabled legislatures, Congress, and the
courts to recognize its immorality. Epstein’s arguments deserve a
brief, further analysis.
First, Professor Epstein contends, “[t]he first way to argue for the
contract at will is to insist upon the importance of freedom of contract
as an end in itself.”149 A moral analysis does not deny value to freedom
of contract, but it would not elevate freedom of contract to an abso-
lute value without qualifications. If every economic decision was
“judged in light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of
the human person,”150 then freedom of contract cannot, morally, be a
freedom to deny human dignity. The law is familiar with the notion
that parties cannot contract to evade public policy. This applies
equally to the freedom to contract. If a worker has a moral right to
reasonable security against arbitrary dismissal, then supporting an em-
ployer’s freedom to deny that right begs the question of whose free-
dom is protected by the at-will rule. The freedom to contract is it not a
freedom to arbitrarily remove another from a job—the very action
that deprives a worker of her self-esteem or “dignity.”
Professor Epstein insists that this alleged freedom of contract also
confers benefits to employees, which makes the contract of more than
ephemeral value. First, the employee is also “free to withdraw for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.”151 While the ability to quit a
job may benefit employees in highly competitive positions and fields,
it is an amiable fiction for the vast majority of American workers who
146. Id. at 951.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 948.
149. Id. at 953.
150. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, at viii (emphasis omitted). R
151. Epstein, supra note 145, at 966. R
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must compete against one another in a depressed and largely service-
oriented job market.
Second, Epstein contends that severance pay, a “feature common
to contracts,” provides protection against arbitrary discharges.152 This
contention attempts to sell an illusion, where there is no indication
that such benefits are either required by law, which is seldom true,153
or widespread by custom. In fact, this contention is an implicit recog-
nition that an employer should have to pay something in order to
make an at-will discharge, a practice that employers will resist as an
unnecessary condition to their right to terminate at-will.
Third, Epstein asserts that employers suffer adverse reputational
damages when a discharged employee’s co-workers perceive the deci-
sion to be arbitrary.154 While this potential exists, his point seems to
be that savvy employers are loath to discharge arbitrarily. It is unclear
how this protects the human dignity of employees of (1) not-so-smart
employers; and/or of (2) employers who have a readily available deep
pool of unemployed workers with which to replace any worker who
feels she can actually afford to quit because she has come to dislike an
employer’s reputation for fairness.
Fourth, Professor Epstein makes the point that the at-will rule ac-
tually “helps workers deal with the problem of risk diversification.”155
That is, an employee is not “locked into an unfortunate contract if he
finds better opportunities elsewhere or if he detects some weakness in
the internal structure of the firm.”156 This point is underwhelming: at
issue is whether an employer can use at-will practices to fire an em-
ployee for immoral reasons, not whether an employee’s contract is
one of a fixed term. An employer can always offer a fixed term or not;
that choice does not logically mean that in either case an employer
can fire for an immoral reason.
Finally, the argument that the at-will doctrine works well as a rule
of construction, where employment contracts fail to address grounds
152. Id. at 967.
153. There is some statutory law that provides a form of severance. For example, the
State of Maine requires a one-time payment to employees upon the closure of a plant in
order to cushion the impact of mass layoffs. The statute has survived attacks by employers
who do not want to provide the benefit. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987). Also, the Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–2109 (2006), requires employers to pay up to sixty days of wages if adequate, ad-
vance notice of certain layoffs or plant closings is not given to workers. § 2104(a)(1)(B).
There are state law counterparts. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400–1408 (West 2011).
154. Epstein, supra note 145, at 968. R
155. Id. at 968–69.
156. Id. at 969.
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for termination, fares no better. According to Epstein, the at-will rule
“tends to lend predictability to litigation” and is “the efficient solu-
tion” to the employment relationship.157 This argument focuses on
the monetary benefits of the doctrine: “The lower cost of both firing
and quitting, therefore, helps account for the very widespread popu-
larity of employment-at-will contracts.”158 It is true that a fear of the
costs of potential litigation perpetuates the at-will rule.159 Morality is
not determined, however, solely by a cost-benefit analysis.
Financial considerations perpetuate the at-will rule, even amongst
the Catholic bishops to whom the Pastoral Letter belongs as part of
their magisterial teaching. I spoke at a Catholic colloquium dedicated
to the tenth anniversary of the Pastoral Letter. In my remarks, I argued
that the at-will rule was rampant in Church personnel manuals, and
that the Pastoral Letter said that all the principles it laid out for the
American economy must also be applied to the Church itself as an
employer.160 I urged the abandonment of the at-will rule in favor of
progressive discipline. Immediately thereafter, one bishop of the local
diocese told me he would get rid of the at-will rule when I got rid of
lawyers. I later learned that he had just received a letter from a lawyer
after the bishop dismissed a clerical worker. Moral principles unfortu-
nately can become expendable under financial and tactical demands.
The incentive to act contrary to the Church’s own norm is, indeed,
quite strong even for those to whom the Pastoral Letter belongs.
The moral analysis made in this Article is not concerned with
control or cost. The moral right to be free from arbitrary dismissal
and the moral right to work to support one’s self and one’s depen-
dents, should not be conditioned upon there first being no loss of
control or no risk of cost. It is precisely at this juncture that the argu-
ment for retaining the at-will rule is laid bare: the risk of diminished
control and a potential for greater cost is pitted against the moral
demand. Such “cost” is but a variant of the proposition that econom-
ics should not be subject to moral principle.
This Article turns next to the question of whether that fear or risk
can be sufficiently reduced in order to entice the common law to re-
ject any further status for the at-will rule.
157. Id. at 951.
158. Id. at 965.
159. The legal costs of presenting a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judg-
ment are far less than the costs of a jury trial.
160. PASTORAL LETTER, supra note 2, paras. 347–58. R
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V. The Common Law Can Change to a More Moral Rule
That Also Protects Employer Prerogatives
This Part examines how the common law can evolve toward a re-
jection of the at-will doctrine. Before the courts will be free to con-
sider the moral unconscionability of the at-will doctrine, statutes
favoring the at-will doctrine will have to change.161 Whether the
change occurs through the legislative or judicial branch, a threshold
issue of whether the law should mandate an alternative rule, as a con-
dition to the rejection of the at-will doctrine, remains. This Part first
addresses this threshold issue.
The initial inquiry has a simple answer grounded in moral analy-
sis: if the at-will doctrine is deemed to be immoral, then there is no
moral justification in continuing it indefinitely until a political or legal
consensus builds around one or more alternatives. Alternatives, how-
ever, are not without their own problems.
Consider the first alternative, a statute requiring employers to
demonstrate just cause for discharge, for example, the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act.162 In these times, it would
be difficult for such an alternative to be adopted legislatively. There
are substantive issues of how to define “good cause,” the nature of the
remedies, and the process that ought to be followed for adjudication.
Some criticism for this alternative suggests that this substitute for the
at-will doctrine should be resisted because it affords workers insuffi-
cient protection.163 The problems here are too varied and subject to
too many different resolutions across the country to require the moral
demise of the at-will doctrine to wait for their resolution.
Consider the second alternative, the expansion of contract law to
embrace all forms of justice, not merely the commutative.164 Such a
change would require a revised notion of the human person “rooted
in community and strengthened by solidarity, sacrifice[,] and shar-
ing.”165 Rougeau sees some hope in Ian McNeil’s relational theory
that attempts to have contract law take seriously the role of relation-
ships, fairness, and cooperation.166 To wait on an uncertain evolution
161. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. R
162. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915
(2011).
163. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment At Will, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (2010).
164. Rougeau, supra note 34, at 136–38. R
165. Id. at 136.
166. Id.
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of contract law, however, seems like an excuse to delay facing directly
the immorality of the at-will rule.
Consider the third alternative, the legislation of process or proce-
dural protections, as opposed to substantive legal protections. There
are serious voices for process-rights to be legislated, at least in certain
occupations.167 The attractiveness to this approach lies in the recogni-
tion of the right of employers to manage their workplace cultures and
needs, which are not always amenable to one-size-fits-all substantive
protections. The idea is to require the use of a process or procedure
in personnel decisions that incentivize employers to meet the legiti-
mate needs and expectations of their workers.168
Consider the fourth alternative, replacing both the at-will and just
cause doctrines by requiring employers to provide employees with no-
tice of termination and income replacement169 for a fixed period.170
This proposal builds upon existing statutes such as the Worker Adjust-
ment Retraining and Notification Act (“WARN”) as well as the contin-
uation of health coverage under federal acts, like the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”) and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”).171 Again, awaiting such fundamental statutory change
should not justifiably delay the demise of the at-will doctrine if that
doctrine is truly immoral.
Employers do not have to sacrifice their control of the right to
hire, fire, and to direct business for a change in common law to occur.
What would be the response of the employers to the loss of the at-will
doctrine? The simple answer is that it will be up to the employers to
continue to comply within the existing federal, state, and local laws
and ordinances. Where laws and ordinances do not constrain an em-
ployer, an employer may do nothing. In the alternative, an employer
167. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Orga-
nizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25;
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Volun-
tary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081 (2010).
168. These ideas are worthy of discussion, but their legislative implementation is uncer-
tain. Therefore, there is no reason to delay the rejection of the at-will doctrine until they
have gained further traction.
169. Including wages and benefits.
170. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 163. R
171. WARN, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2006); Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1168; Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (“HIPAA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1183.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-3\SAN302.txt unknown Seq: 31 16-MAY-12 10:04
Winter 2012] REJECTION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE 685
can adopt some procedures to regulate terminations, at least discipli-
nary ones. This is so-called “progressive discipline.”172
Progressive discipline173 is practiced in this country and is ex-
pected of American employers doing business in many foreign coun-
tries. Non-union employers frequently use progressive discipline. In
the unionized workplace, labor arbitrators expect it routinely.174 Pro-
gressive discipline satisfies an employer’s right to control, and it also
has the potential to satisfy the worker’s moral right to be free from
discharge for any reason, no reason, or even for an immoral but legal
reason.
The purpose of progressive discipline makes it congenial to the
moral principles discussed above:
The purpose of a progressive discipline system is to ensure that
discipline is imposed consistently and equitably, with an eye toward
correcting deficient performance and securing compliance with
working rules, not toward punishing employees. The philosophy of
corrective discipline requires that discipline not be unduly severe
(i.e., disproportionate to the offense) and that employees be af-
forded at least a measure of industrial due process. By the same
token, the discipline must be severe enough to effect correction.
Accordingly, the procedures cannot be so cumbersome that the
essential purpose of discipline (i.e., to modify unacceptable behav-
ior) cannot be achieved.175
Warnings are singularly important.176 Warnings apprise an em-
ployee of what is wanted and serve to put an employee on notice that
work performance needs to improve or conduct needs to change.
However, warnings are a form of fundamental fairness that the at-will
doctrine finds too costly or too risky.
The use of progressive discipline actually can help an employer
discourage wrongful discharge lawsuits or prevail in them if they com-
172. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION
34 (Norman Brand et al. eds., 1998).
173. A progressive discipline system typically starts with a verbal or written warning,
followed by a disciplinary suspension, and ultimately ends with discharge. A more sophisti-
cated system may begin with verbal counseling, often considered non-disciplinary, and
thereafter provide a verbal or written warning. However, many offenses are not suitable for
progressive discipline and may justify immediate discharge. The writing and dissemination
of an employment policy to employees can be easily tailored to a particular employer’s
business by human resources professionals, especially by management members of the em-
ployment labor bar.
174. Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 51.
175. STEVEN C. KAHN & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES
§ 9.33 (2010).
176. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 62, at 992–93. R
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mence. An employer who follows established fair procedures could
proffer such compliance as a defense to a wrongful discharge claim.177
The availability of progressive discipline should hasten the day
when the common law recognizes that the at-will doctrine is morally
unacceptable. That is its true significance. It need not be mandated by
statute. After all, it is not a panacea because while it stresses “process,”
it may be misused to elevate process over substantive fairness. Clearly,
it is quite possible for human resources persons to serve their em-
ployer’s interests by using progressive discipline as wallpaper to hide
what is really an at-will termination.
In such a case, a court, in theory, should be allowed to unpaper
the true situation. Indeed, courts may come to expect progressive dis-
cipline of employers defending wrongful termination suits, just as la-
bor arbitrators have. Seriously administered, progressive discipline
can allow employers to manage their business and help workers to
receive something better than the immoral arbitrariness of at-will
status.
Although frequently misunderstood by non-lawyers, the common
law does evolve. Ever since Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”178
In California as in other jurisdictions of Anglo-American heritage,
the common law “is not a codification of exact or inflexible rules
for human conduct . . . but is rather the embodiment of broad and
comprehensive unwritten principles, inspired by natural reason
and an innate sense of justice, and adopted by common consent
for the regulation and government of the affairs of men. . . .
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and
change is its most significant feature. . . . It is constantly expanding
and developing in keeping with advancing civilization and the new
conditions and progress of society . . . .”179
“This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar
boast and excellence of the common law.”180
177. Epstein, supra note 145, at 966. R
178. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
179. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 415–16 (Cal. 1988) (first, second,
and last omissions in original) (quoting Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669,
676 (Cal. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Conclusion
The common law should recognize that the at-will rule is not
morally sustainable. Such recognition is not an Olympic-size long
jump. As shown in Part III supra, the courts and legislative bodies
across this country have already rejected the at-will doctrine because it
does not fit with our moral consensus on issues that implicate public
policy. To be sure, one of the tenets of the common law, at least in
commercial affairs, is predictability.
American employers are already familiar with the need to articu-
late lawful reasons to support terminations of employees in order to
defend against claims of race, gender, age, and other discrimination
(or to establish that a particular discharge was not a pretext for an
unprotected reason). Indeed, United States multinationals long ago
accepted that they cannot export the at-will rule abroad; rather, they
must accept the social compacts of host countries, the vast majority of
whom, both in the developed and developing worlds, exact a greater
respect for employee rights.181
To eliminate the at-will doctrine would foster predictable uni-
formity. It would recognize the evolutionary development to date and
provide equal treatment for employees—allowing only termination
based on work performance, work unavailability, or work conduct.
The well-developed concept of progressive discipline gives employers
a ready tool for a cogent, fair human resources process. The cost and
risk to employers of having to forego the at-will rule is more than equi-
tably counterbalanced. A concern for cost and risk is not a morally
acceptable basis for a continuation of the at-will doctrine. Its rejection
as a legal basis for continuing the doctrine, in the face of all the ex-
ceptions that have evolved to date, is an idea whose time has come.
Natural reason and an innate sense of justice would so dictate.
It will be objected that such final denouement should be left to a
legislature. As former California Supreme Court Justice Marcus Kauf-
man once said in reply to the same contention: “The courts are the
custodians of the common law—not the economists, or the legislators,
or even the law professors. We abdicate that duty when we abjure deci-
sion of common law questions under the guise of ‘deference’ to the
political branches.”182
181. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., U.S.-Based Multinational Employers and the “Social Contract”
Outside the United States, 43 INT’L LAW. 1237 (2009).
182. Foley, 765 P.2d at 417.
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It will be objected that some state statutes preclude a change in
the common law. That may be so but legislative bodies can remove
these offending statutes. Where there is no clear statutory obstacle,
the fact alone that prior state decisional law has supported the at-will
rule is no obstacle to change, for “[o]ur cases have clearly established
that ‘[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law.’”183
The “arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards jus-
tice.”184 With respect to the at-will doctrine, it needs to bend further.
183. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978).
184. An expression often used by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and perhaps originating
in nineteenth century Unitarian minister Theodore Parker. Arthur Howe, The Arc of the
Universe Is Long But It Bends Towards Justice, OPEN SALON (Jan. 19, 2009), http://open.salon.
com/blog/arthur_howe/2009/01/18/the_arc_of_the_universe_is_long_but_it_bends_to-
wards_justice.
